The Aerotoxic Logbook (ATLB) in English (EN)

The problem has been known since the 1950s - roughly 70 years and nothing has ever been done about it.  The air in the cabin is still ‚bled off’ (the engines) in airplanes - with the well-known possible consequences for flight safety and health, in particular that of  flight crew. We have the cultural history on 'Flying is safe' and the ongoing problems investigated at (EN).

Although the cabin air is 50% re-circulated in modern aircraft types, the basic problem remains unsolved. With one exception: the Boeing B787.  This is/was also the state of knowledge at the first big conference on this topic in London in September 2017. The presentations can now be viewed here:  

There are many reasons why no solutions are found: the targeted influencing of scientific discussions, the airlines’ economic interests, the links between politics and air transport industry and other reasons.

The ‚Aerotoxic Logbook’, launched in January 2017, is a first comprehensive documentation addressing the problem of potentially contaminated cabin air ( - German) and documents what is happening in this area.  Or, what is not happening. And why not. This German language blog ( is now also available in English and can be accessed directly via this permalink: And you should also have a look at - an "ABC" under permanent construction.

The information we collect in German is translated by Bearnairdine BEAUMONT who operates the network  and the blog

With the ‚Aerotoxic Logbook’ we want to achieve international networking,  bringing together all initiatives and activities to communicate about this unsolved problem and to initiate solutions. At the same time it is a scientific experiment: What must happen before a problem is addressed?

Other initiatives providing information on the contaminated air issue you can get here (right side).

Beginning of May 2019

In March we had addressed the CSU's transport policy spokesman in the European Parliament, Markus FERBER, who in connection with the crash of two Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft had clearly criticised EASA because the authorities had known about the problems of this type of aircraft. But, they said nothing, published nothing and warned no one which is a typical behavior of regulators whose employees are exclusively concerned with their service regulations and have no empathy for potentially injured parties. Markus FERBER had said: "A flight safety authority that classifies a software error as a risk only after two planes have crashed is a risk for the citizen himself".

We brought Markus FERBER's attention to the problem of potentially contaminated cabin air and he replied:

  • That he agrees that "this issue deserves more public attention".
  • That the EP had on many occasions pointed out to the commission that "this problem should be examined"
  • who therefore commissioned an investigation by EASA
  • the results of which should be available in December of this year.
  • And this is because the Commission is demanding that "events containing unusual odours and smoke must be reported in accordance with Regulation EU No. 376/2014".

FERBER writes:

"I believe that EASA - like any authority - must be closely watched and that one should not hesitate to point out shortcomings and errors. The issue of potentially contaminated cabin air is of great interest to me, I will follow the publication of the study results critically at the end of the year".

We will support Markus FERBER.

18th March 2019

 EASA and Flight Safety Prevention

What is to be thought of the reliability and usefulness of EASA in this respect, EASA boss Patrick KY shared at the Transport Committee of the European Parliament (TRAN) on March 18th: After the fatal crash of a Boeing 737 Max 8 of the Indonesian airline Lion Air in October 2018, EASA knew already a short while afterward about the problems of the not really working MCAS software and the insufficient training of the pilots in handling it. KY now had to admit this in response to questions from MEPs.

No warning followed on the part of EASA. Also, this potential problem was obviously not communicated at all.

Instead, there was now a second crash of such an aircraft of Ethiopian Airlines on March 10th causing 157 deaths. And only now the EASA comes out with such information - after parliamentary inquiries and pressure.

Markus FERBER, the European CSU's Transport Spokesman in the EU Parliament, has a clear opinion on this issue:

"A flight safety authority that only considers a software error a risk only after two aircraft have crashed represents a risk for the citizen himself".

We now want to hear from Markus FERBER whether he also wants to ask EASA about the contaminated cabin air problem.