Is the German Judiciary independent?
Many doubt it. Mostly for a good reason.
Such doubts have overcome a judge from the administrative court in Wiesbaden that he has submitted this question to the European Court of Justice in Brussels (EuGH) for decision. The judge does not seem to believe in the constitutionally codified independence of the judges and the courts in Germany.
As early as April 2019, the European Court of Justice - unnoticed by most - made a statement on the independence of German public prosecutors - they denied their "independence." Because: German public prosecutors are dependent - e.g., on instructions of the executive branch, i.e., their highest boss, the respective minister of justice - laid down in the court constitution law. Moreover, that has nothing more to do with the independence of a public prosecutor, according to Europe's highest judges. That is why German public prosecutors can no longer enforce European arrest warrants in other EU countries. Because for lack of independence, they do not comply with European law (Az: C 508/18, C 82/19, C 509/18).
Many examples, which were documented by us, always made that clear:
www.ansTageslicht.de/Rocker , www.ansTageslicht.de/Mollath www.ansTageslicht.de/HaraldFriedrich , www.ansTageslicht.de/KW , www.ansTageslicht.de/RG , www.ansTageslicht.de/Theisen , www.ansTageslicht.de/DZBank , www.ansTageslicht.de/Zahnschmerz
However, now it is official, i.e., EU official.
The file question:
Now it concerns the European application of the law, which must decide on the following question:
"Is the referring court an independent and impartial court? so the reference resolution of the Wiesbadener of the administrative judge (Az: 6 K 1016/15).
According to European requirements, a "court" must
- be autonomous and hierarchically independent in order to
- to be able to decide impartially.
Something the referring judge does not regard as a given because, in this country, there would be "only functional judicial independence, but not institutional independence of the courts."
- Judges are not appointed by an independent institution (e.g., Federal President), but by the respective justice ministers
- They also decide on promotion.
- The ministry is also responsible for "judging" a judge.
In other words, the executive 'controls' the judiciary. And not vice versa, since there are things such as instructions and indirect influencing, which can steer the decisions of judges. "The mere danger of political influence on the courts (by equipment, personnel allocation by the Ministry of Justice) can cause a danger of the influence on the decisions of the courts and their independent perception of their tasks to impair.
For example, this could generate "anticipatory obedience," e.g., through alleged pressure to get things done, which is exercised, for example, through "stress statistics (Pebbsy) operated by the ministry."
The executive decides on a judicial career and its control. Whoever adapts to the currently desired mainstream has good chances — also, vice versa.
Should the ECJ retain its previous criteria for "independence," as it did with the question of the independence of public prosecutors, then its vote is - actually - predictable. The case number at the ECJ is C 272/19.
Further information can be found here:
The "DokZentrum ansTageslicht.de" will 'stay tuned' for further progress, and will report about any possibly necessary consequences.