The Aerotoxic Logbook (ATLB) in English (EN)

The problem has been known since the 1950s - roughly 70 years and nothing has ever been done about it.  The air in the cabin is still ‚bled off’ (the engines) in airplanes - with the well-known possible consequences for flight safety and health, in particular that of  flight crew. We have the cultural history on 'Flying is safe' and the ongoing problems investigated at www.ansTageslicht.de/cabinair (EN).

Although the cabin air is 50% re-circulated in modern aircraft types, the basic problem remains unsolved. With one exception: the Boeing B787.  This is/was also the state of knowledge at the first big conference on this topic in London in September 2017. The presentations can now be viewed here: www.aircraftcabinair.com  

There are many reasons why no solutions are found: the targeted influencing of scientific discussions, the airlines’ economic interests, the links between politics and air transport industry and other reasons.

The ‚Aerotoxic Logbook’, launched in January 2017, is a first comprehensive documentation addressing the problem of potentially contaminated cabin air (www.ansTageslicht.de/Kabininenluft - German) and documents what is happening in this area.  Or, what is not happening. And why not. This German language blog (www.ansTageslicht.de/ATLB) is now also available in English and can be accessed directly via this permalink: www.ansTageslicht.de/ENATLB.

The information we collect in German is translated by Bearnairdine BEAUMONT who operates the network www.aerotoxicteam.com  and the blog www.aerotoxicsyndrombook.com/blog.

With the ‚Aerotoxic Logbook’ we want to achieve international networking,  bringing together all initiatives and activities to communicate about this unsolved problem and to initiate solutions. At the same time it is a scientific experiment: What must happen before a problem is addressed?

Other initiatives providing information on the contaminated air issue you can get here (right side).

16th August 2018

It is a first that now a (German) „Passenger Association“ has taken a position in terms of fume events and cabin air.

In a detailed (open) position paper concerning Aerotoxic Syndrome, the „Verbraucherschutzverein www.VPassagier.com“, which is also committed to a "sustainable transport policy", is crystal clear:  beginning with the publication of fume event incidents’, to demands of putting an end to the inaction of the supervisory authorities, and finally to install sensors and filters in all commercial aircraft.

The position paper can be read under „Position on Aerotoxic Syndrome in Airliners and the Risks for Passengers“. (DE) 

13th August 2018

BFU responds: again foggy

Within the context of our presentation of Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings’ incident on 19th December 2010, we asked the BFU in April 2018: What was the result from the medical examination of the pilot who was unable to fly for six months after the fume event? Answer:

"A viewing of the ... expert opinion cannot be granted due to the „protection of sensitive security information act“ having to be guaranteed according to Article 14 Regulation (EU) 996/2010.“

In other words: In order to "protect sensitive security interests", the affected pilot must not know what medical findings the experts have established in his own case.

We have taken this as an opportunity to ask again:

a) Exacly which passage of the Regulation (EU) 996/2010 that you are citing  opposes the request of the pilot concerned, to inspect the expert opinion concerning himself?

b) What are the exact grounds for the necessity in "protection of sensitive safety information" that the pilot is not allowed to see? (…)“

We have received another reply:

  • Paragraphs 1 and 2 clarify this in principle: "The (...) documents may not be made available for purposes other than those of the safety investigation (...)". According to paragraph 1 lit.c, this also applies to medical documents
  • Paragraph 3 codifies the exception: "The benefit of the disclosure of the documents protected by paragraphs 1 and 2 must, in individual cases,

    • o   (1) be for a legally permissible purpose and outweigh
    • o   (2) the adverse domestic and foreign effects that disclosure may have for this or future safety investigations".

In summary: The BFU have examined all this and decided that the pilot concerned  apparently should not know about it, in order to "protect sensitive safety information" with "detrimental domestic and foreign effects".

We will again ask and have them explain the potentially "detrimental domestic and foreign effects".

We look forward to what the next answer will turn out to be.

3rd, August 2018

Commission's response to BfR's poisoning assessment

At the end of June we reported, that six years ago this panel of experts had dealt with the topic of fume events (view entry 27th June) but that they had shelved the topic - after "intensive discussions".

This was a reason for us to ask whether the commissions' members would be interested in more detailed information about the close crash in question at Cologne-Bonn airport, in particular regarding  the two pilots' flight reports (see Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings: 19 December 2010). We had just sent these notes to everyone.

The commission's management now replied: "We will take these into account in our case evaluation and if new toxicological findings are available, we will discuss the facts again at the BfR Commission 'Assessment of Poisoning' meeting."

We will now ask how the commission how they intend to find the "existence of new toxicological findings". Whether they just want to wait for them, or whether they will ask specific questions,  or do research and if so, how exactly. Or whether they would like to commission expertises themselves.

No matter how:  We are staying on the ball.

BG Verkehr at the 10th Commercial Pilots' Day

As we now know, BG Verkehr offered a new presentation about  "Fume events in aircraft, the problems as seen from BG's standpoint",  to be viewed on YouTube, but suddenly offline.

The head of the Department for Prevention, Dr. Jörg HEDTMANN reports little news, but confirms that BG Verkehr now recognises such incidents as "occupational accidents". However, they do not consider from their point of view,  the possible long-term health consequences. Reason: One sticks to the "commonly known school of thought"  (34th minute into the video recording).

Since we - so far - do not know any "common school of thought" regarding this problem (at least none that should be taken seriously), we asked Mr. HEDTMANN which experts' names he associates with the "common school of thought". We made this request on 29th July.

We will report when we receive the answer.