The Aerotoxic Logbook (ATLB) in English (EN)

Now we've reconstructed everything: How a WDR documentary "Nervengift im Flugzeug"(Nerve Toxins in Aircraft)  turned into 2 (different) films – all directed by Tim van BEVEREN. The WDR film disappeared in to their archive. TvB's cinema production is available on DVD or via streaming: unfiltered breathed in.

WDR did not answer our questions, although they had a week to do so. Due to that we can't finally clarify what the public broadcaster’s understanding by "fact check" is - maybe just 'alternative facts'?

The whole story can be found here www.ansTageslicht.de/WDR  (translation in progress)

Once again we received a not very enlightning answer from the BFU. But that is obviously not what this authority is about.

On August 13th of this year, we wanted to find out why the co-pilot of the Germanwings aircraft, which had apparently been involved in a severe fume event on December 19th, 2010 while in the landing phase to Cologne-Bonn Airport (view www.ansTageslicht.de/Germanwings), was not allowed to see a medical report  about his state of health, which was made a whole year later. After this incident, the co-pilot was unfit to fly for over six months,  the captain was able to return to flying just four days later. A typical situation, showing how people’s bodies with their genetic pre-/dispositions metabolize or detox foreign substances differently.

The first answer referred to data protection reason:  because of the need to guarantee the protection of sensitive security information in accordance with Art. 14 of Regulation (EU) 996/2010. Not necessarily comprehensible when someone wants to know the medical results of his own state of health.

Furthermore, we received the answer (which we could not really understand, which is why we repeated the question - in the mean time twice -): That the expert opinion evaluated and compared the facts which are interwoven due to the captain and the co-pilot having experienced the same event. The listing of the clinical data of two people in one medical report does not make sense to us. For data protection reasons, one could black out all the information that the other should not see, which is a common procedure.

For this reason we asked again why this did not happen. And also, if we were to understand the BFU's statement, that the expert opinion considers both the captain and the co-pilot in terms of content at the same time and ‚interwoven’, due to experiencing the same event in such a way,  that the clinical data of both were continuously compared and intertwined? And if that was the case, why was that done? We documented these questions on November 7th.

We have received an answer to that, which we summarize here. We would like to spare our readers’ the trouble of trying to figure out the somewhat cumbersome answers.

The BFU press office answered our question no. 1, whether we were to understand the first answer (that the report considers both pilots together), in such a way that all clinical data are continuously interwoven with each other, with:

Instead of answering yes or no (for clarity), they convolute a series of 143 words and numbers to - 853. „Yes“ would have meant 2, „No“  would have been 4 characters. And the original explanatory phrase also reappears in the bundle, to which we had requested an answer for reasons of clarity (see above).

According to the BFU, our question as to whether this was intentionally done and/or whether it was customary for the BFU to do so, was unnecessary, as it was answered in the set of explanatory 143 words.

However (answer to our questions 5 and 6), in such cases the persons concerned can view a draft of the final report, which they could comment on.

‚Report’ however does not mean that it includes the medical opinion, only the final report of the investigation of the "event" in question. So, that what is not (or should not be) included in the final report must not be revealed to those affected. At any rate, the BFU's wording on this point is crystal clear.

The Bundestag Transport Committee has no "capacities" for the problems of statutory accident insurance and Fume Events

We had written to the four relevant committees of the Bundestag following the Federal Government's response to the Greens' question on these two aspects (entry dated 18th September), in order to find out whether they could identify contradictions in the Federal Government's responses which we have seen, and 2) whether they were of the opinion that the "own research" of the German Statutory Accident Insurance (DGUV) could be regarded as independent. Here you can read the cover letter and the 4 questions.

The first commitee has replied: "A further answer" is "not possible due to lack of capacity". Instead, the office refers to a Bundestag page where one can look up all previous  minutes from many legislative periods from this commitee.

This says a lot about the perception of the subject we are discussing in the committee’s office. We will now put our questions directly to the representatives of the political groups.

Judgement of the Labour Court Cologne

It is now known that two flight attendants who claim to have suffered injury to their health because they were exposed to cabin air contamination for 45 minutes, lost their case before the Labour Court in Cologne: They claimed damages because their airline acted "intentionally". In concrete terms, such an incident had even occurred the day before.

The airline and the judges argued that the aircraft operator subsequently undertook a technical review and therefore no longer could expect that a new incident would occur the next day. Therefore, intent could be excluded and only in such cases the employer could be held liable according to § 104 SGB VII.

Therefore, the court did not have to examine whether there was a scientifically justified connection at all.

We are currently trying to find out what exactly the technical examination consisted off, e.g. whether the manufacturer’s instructions in the operating manual were followed, or whether - as is usually the case - it was just a small mini-check.

If there are clear recommendations or instructions in the operating manual but no action has been taken, the argument "no intent" would be untenable.

Answer from the Federal Government to a ‚small inquiry’

In the mean time the Federal Government has answered a ‚small inquiry’ submitted by the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, asking about the numbers of fume event occurrences: Printed matter 19/4443.

 As always, the Federal Government's answer is: They have little information and apparently want to know even less.

As it is,  also known from USA,  incidents are under-reported.  There are no mandatory reporting channels. Airlines are also 'not amused' about reports, because a reasonably effective cleaning of the air conditioning system and/or an exchange of the so-called ducts between engine and air conditioning system means considerable delays in further deployment of the aircraft. This means on one hand costs, on the other hand loss of revenue. Also for this reason experience has shown, that only some of such incidents are reported. Also considering that in most cases they are probably  (only?) less dramatic "odour events".

The considerable differences between reported incidents and actual incidents have been pointed out as examples under "Incidents“, which usually do not appear in official statistics.

Parliamentary State Secretary Steffen BILGER (CDU) answered on behalf of the Federal Government this question: "What is the Federal Government planning to do to ensure that as many fume events as possible are reported?

"The Federal Government has no evidence that Fume Events that have to be reported are not reported. Therefore, no additional measures are planned."

And the answer to the question: "To what extent is the Federal Government considering the nationwide mandatory introduction of breathing air filters that remove organophosphates and volatile organic compounds?“

"The specific substances that may contaminate cabin air have not yet been sufficiently identified or known. Only when these have been fully identified it is possible and effective to develop an appropriate filter."

The passenger association „Vereinigung Passagiere“ (VP) comments on this as follows:

"Parts of the aviation industry are more aware of the problem than the German government, because airlines such as EasyJet and Lufthansa are already testing such filter systems," (quote VP).

In fact, EasyJet in particular wants to equip all its planes with filters from Pall in the New Year (see entry from 20.9.2017 which can be found quickly when entering "EasyJet" in the search-bar). The airline announced this last year at the conference about contaminated cabin air/ aerotoxic syndrome in London.

The Federal Government and the Ministry of Transport have no idea about this and apparently also not about the two EASA studies. And, obviously they don't want to know anything.  

As has now become known, the Bundestag’s Scientific Service has made a compilation of the question:

"Which legal requirements in Germany or at the level of the European Union would have to be specifically changed in order to oblige operators and/or manufacturers of civil passenger aircraft to install appropriate filter systems?“

Two institutions have commented on this.

1) The Federal Ministry of Transport refers to the competence of EASA and notes that the BFU has knowledge "that Fume events with the usual appearance characteristics also occur at airlines which already use filters". However, the BMVI does not give an exact source.

2) The most detailed statement comes from the Vereinigung Cockpit Association (VC)  (pages 5&6): VC points out that there are already sufficient EU regulations, namely the EU Directives 98/24/EC and 89/391/EEC "on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work".

These would be implemented in all sectors (chemical industry, hazardous goods, noise protection) because fines would also be imposed. But not in aviation.

Therefore, no legal regulations would have to be changed or newly drawn up. Only existing regulations would have to be observed. But: "Neither the licensing authorities check compliance, nor the supervisory authorities see themselves obliged to do so." quote VC.

Here are the documents:

• Scientific Service: Measures against so-called Fume Events
• previous Bundestag document Precautions for the prevention of Fume Events. On p. 6  the reference can be found, that the EASA denies a connection between Fume Events and health consequences, because a study done by the Cranford University in 2011 on 100 flights (in words: one hundred) with five „large aircraft types "could not prove any so-called fume events with health-damaging concentrations".

• EU Directive 98/24
• EU Directive 89/391

The BFU has answered - instead of answers: 2 complaints

We had sent several queries to the BFU with entry date 13th August. We quoted from the first answer the BFU gave us, which we wanted to have clarified. These were our questions, but instead of clear answers to our questions, the BFU Press Office complains.

Allegation no.1:

That we had published their answers, which could only be seen as factual information, as quotations.

You have to know that press offices are usually dissatisfied with the media and journalists, if they either don't write what the Press Office would like them to write, or if there is a critical follow-up. In this respect, the BFU's complaint is nothing unusual.

However, there is no legal entitlement for an authority not to publish its answers as quotes. Nevertheless, they are obliged to provide information.

It is common practice that the media like to quote such answers, or parts of them. And has its reasons to remain as close as possible to what an authority answers. And also not to have to expose oneself to the accusation that one has not correctly reproduced the information. The fact that one or the other authority tries to enforce its own modalities of reproduction is explained by the fact that authorities are basically monopolies. And they forget that they are - actually - service providers: for people, including the media. But this obviously does not go well with the BFU's official culture.

Allegation no.2:

That we published only a part of their last answer, omitting the decisive part.

Presumably, (but we don't yet know exactly why we have to ask again to gain clarity), we didn't clearly understand one of their phrases and therefore verified it beforehand because, from our point of view, it was rather "nebulous",  at least not to be understood clearly, namely: That the medical opinion in question, which the pilot in question is not allowed to see, is obviously constantly mixed with the clinical information of both pilots, i.e. that of the captain and the co-pilot. And that is why the co-pilot - for data protection reasons so to speak - cannot find out what concerns him alone.

That's why we asked again today:

1.       Does your reference to the fact that the medical report considers both the pilot and the co-pilot in terms of content and inseparably with the view to the shared event perhaps mean, that the medical report is written linguistically in such a way that the clinical data of both pilots are continuously compared and interwoven with each other?

2.        Would it have been possible for the co-pilot to have (or be allowed to) learn about his own data by anonymizing the data of his colleague.

3.       If the latter would not have been possible: Was this deliberately arranged in such a way that neither pilot could (or was allowed to) learn anything about the clinical results?

4.       If option no.3 does not apply: Is it customary for the BFU, when commissioning medical reports in such cases, to ensure that patients are not allowed to know anything about their state of health?

5.       If it is not customary at BFU for patients not to have access to their personal medical findings: Why, then, was it not ensured in this specific case that those affected were allowed to know what the Air Force's Aeromedical Institute had determined about their physical condition?

6.       Can the BFU imagine that in such cases, those affected might have a legitimate interest in finding out exactly what the medical results are and how they came about methodically - irrespective of the information mentioned in the final report starting on page 30?

And we concluded, that we did not consider the Press Office's announcement that its complaints no.1 and no.2 were no basis for further cooperation or exchange with us, as a threat.

Perhaps the press office of the BFU meant it as such. But authorities are basically obliged to provide information. And if they think that as a monopoly they can decide for themselves who they want to give information to and  who they don't want to give it to, then information can quite easily be forced through an administrative court. But it will probably not (have to) come to that.

We will continue to report.

"Film without author"? The "public" TV station WDR puts a journalist under financial pressure. Does it want to silence him?

We reported about this case on 22nd October. The Public Broadcasting Station "WDR", Cologne, has now replied:"Due to the ongoing proceedings, we are currently unable to provide you with any information."

That is why we are now asking them again:

"1) Do I understand you correctly that you are (want to, should, must) stating that you cannot (want to, should, may not) say - with reference to the fact that there is a procedure - whether such procedures are customary at WDR? Regardless of this individual case?

2) Can one conclude from this, that this - quite obviously - represents normal case scenario at WDR, regarding:

a) the procedure in question?

b) the fact that you cannot (want to, should not, may not) say anything about it?

3) And can (want, should, may) you - if necessary - answer our questions at all after the proceedings have been concluded?"

We will stay on the ball. Also regarding the planned reconstruction of the entire process.

Medical Advisory Board of Experts 'Occupational Diseases' at BMAS

In the meantime, the committee met on 11th September 2018. On their agenda the item "Fume Events".

Prof. Dr. Astrid HEUTELBECK, former lecturer at the University of Göttingen, now Professor of Occupational and Social Medicine at the University of Jena, was heard as an "external expert" who held the so-called „Fume Event Consultation Hour“ at the UMG in Göttingen until the end of 2017. Which however had to close because the BG Verkehr refused to pay the costs for fume-event patients, which would actually be it's duty.

Prof. HEUTELBECK reported mainly on her findings, i.e. experiences and clinical pictures of her more than 350 fume event patients.

However, the committee in which several representatives of the so-called „VALENTIN School“ sit, is not satisfied with this information:

"After examining the findings presented and the documents submitted, the Advisory Board concludes that there are currently no sufficient indications to enter into an in-depth scientific examination. At present the general situation of knowledge is still unclear, it lacks epidemiological evidence and further peer reviewed literature on the topic of Fume Events' , states the responsible BMAS official, Harald GOEKE (Dept. IV a 4) in a letter to the ‚patient initiative’ p-coc.com.

Now it depends on further studies to confirm these (mostly denied) connections, which requires appropriate funds.

Film without Author? The "public" TV station WDR puts a journalist under financial pressure. Do they want to silence him?

For 30 years, filmmaker and journalist Tim van BEVEREN worked, amongst for others, also for the WDR, and produced from 2009 to 2011 several films about fume events and their consequences for the "public broadcaster", thus becoming the first in Germany to bring this problem into public focus.

A large project with the title "Nervengift im Flugzeug" (Nerve Poison in Airplanes), which was broadcast by WDR in „Format“ – „Die Story" (The Story), led to content-related disputes. Tim van BEVEREN's co-author, then Dr. Roman STUMPF, today: Roman RUSCH, who, while being a full-time employed WDR editor , studied at the private Quadriga University in Berlin, whose sponsors include companies such as Airbus and Lufthansa (which obviously posed no problem for WDR), continued working on the film by himself and Tim van BEVEREN was excluded. Lufthansa for example, did not want to take part as an interview partner in a film made by van BEVEREN . (view entry from 7th July 2014 at www.ansTageslicht.de/cabinairchronology).

DokZentrum ansTageslicht is in the process of reconstructing the origins and oddities of this strange history which ultimately led to a programme complaint by a Scottish lawyer, which mentions amongst other things, "deception of the audience“ . However,  this was smoothed out by the WDR Broadcasting Council.

As a result, WDR tried to refute reproaches and critical inquiries in "Fact Check", by disseminating partly untrue factual allegations about Van BEVEREN. For a freelance journalist this can leed quickly to a journalistic 'death sentence'. 

Tim van BEVEREN tried to defend himself against these claims in court. Unsuccessfully. The Landgericht Mainz was of the opinion that he had to accept (this is inaccurate) "factual allegations" which "cannot have a significant effect on the personality of the person concerned". 

Now the WDR wants to recover its lawyer's fees. At court. Tim van BEVEREN should the 'oath of disclosure'.

It was in this context that we asked WDR these questions today:

1.      Is it normal for the WDR that you want to financially gag journalists with whom you have a content-related dispute?

2.      If this is not the normal case, why are you doing it in this case?

3.      Have you ever thought about another solution?

4.      And what exactly are the reasons why you are putting such financial pressure on a former employee?

We will stay on the ball. In every respect.

(Additional information:

The film in question was never broadcast again, although the topic has come more and more in to the public focus.

In order to make sure that WDR will not sue us as well - for example for any copyright infringement of its logo - we made this one ourselves. It is not the original logo).

Contaminated cabin air now brought before the International Criminal Court

In an Open Letter the Aerotoxic Association called upon the public prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, to take action, stating that the existence of potentially poisoned cabin air violates several international regulations. Among other things, it violates ‚The Right to Healthy Indoor Air’, as demanded by the WHO;  also against the „Air Quality Guidelines“, Global update 2005: „Particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide“.

Even EASA demands in its regulation CS 25.831 the same as does the Code of Federal Regulations of the USA regarding air traffic:

"Crew and passenger compartment air must be free from harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases or vapours" (p. 1 D 38f)

And this in fact, is not the case. Especially not when fume events occur that are more than just "smells".

The original Open Letter is accompanied by 2 full folders of documents, scientific evidence, previous court documents, supporting documents and testimonials from more than 100 affected persons, documenting this disastreous calamity that has persisted for decades.

British coroners to look out for toxic cabin air effects in their investigations

In connection with the investigation of a deceased former flight attendant, the responsible coroner (official investigator into deaths) has asked the chief coroner to look into such cases in the future to verify whether the contaminated cabin air might have played a roll.

The British trade union UNITE, which is currently involved in more than 100 court cases concerning injuries to the health of flight crew, wants to take this opportunity to publicly discuss this fundamental problem, which airlines and manufacturers are still largely ignoring.

More under ‚Call for Public Inquiry’ following coroner’s warning of toxic cabin air

Occupational Diseases in Court: Only 10% of all cases are successful

Last year the Federal Government had „no idea“ when they answered the LEFT Party (printed matter 18/13543) "due to lack of statistic data by the DGUV", regarding the question how many cases exist that have actually received occupational ill health acknowledgment before the Federal Social Court, thus were successful,  or failed.

Now, all of a sudden, the Federal Government, in the person of Parliamentary State Secretary (BMAS), Ms Kerstin GRIESE (SPD) announced in an answer to the Greens (printed matter 19/4093 - see entry v. 18.9.):

"For decades the decisions of the accident insurance institutions have been confirmed in about 90% of the Federal Social Court proceedings. From this "the quality of the experts employed and the administrative procedures" can be seen.

We have a somewhat different view of things, as we have documented in many examples (www.ansTageslicht.de/Letzel; www.ansTageslicht.de/Lehnert; www.ansTageslicht.de/BK1317 etc.).

We have therefore added  thefollowing section to the chapter "What can one do?" (WKMT): "In Court". There you will find information on how to proceed when you wish to reject an expert, or his expert opinion because of "bad expertise“,  and if the judge refuses this, how to reject the judge. In the latter case, it is not the "bias" that is important, but the potential "concern of bias".

That this does not work in most cases is due to the fact that neither the judges nor most lawyers are familiar with the right of bias.

We can help and give tips & hints: at www.ansTageslicht.de/WKMT

We are waiting for several answers:

1) We had asked BG Verkehr (employer’s liability insurance association) and Dr. HEDTMANN, which experts’ (names) represent the "doctrine" that there is no connection between fume events, which are now recognized as "occupational accidents", and long-term health consequences.

So far, only evasive responses have been made, aimed at ensuring that all limit values are complied with in commercial aircraft. And that this is probably the reason why there could be no causal connection.

The answer to the question as to which limit values were meant was: all the "air limit values" listed in the TRGS (Technical Rules for Hazardous Substances).

However, they do not include all of those identified by EASA, for example. And there is also no information on the (additive and/or multiplicative) effects of such substances with changing air pressure values, oxygen saturations and temperatures.

We are now waiting for further explanations.

2) The BFU (entry from 13 August) is apparently of the firm opinion that the two pilots of the 19th December 2010 (Cologne-Bonn airport) accident, are not allowed to view their own medical reports because "data protection" prohibits it.

Now we want to know exactly what the BFU understands by "data protection". And why, according to Article 14 of EU Regulation 996/2010, the interest of those affected in finding out something about their state of health is not a "legally permissible purpose" , that allows such information to be "passed on".

3) The Medical Advisory Board for Occupational Diseases at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) met on 4th October. Allegedly on the agenda: Fume Events.

We asked whether the topic had been discussed, and if so, what would happen next.

4) After the Federal Government has answered the „small inquiry“ of the Bundestag faction Alliance 90/The Greens (see 18th September), we now asked the members of 4 relevant Bundestag committees, whether they intend to be satisfied with the partially distracting from the problem and partically misleading answers by the Federal Government. Or what else they intend to do.

"Those who work make mistakes. Those who work a lot sometimes make more mistakes.

The Federal Government responds to the „small inquiry“ from „BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN“ (Green Party):

Following our publications at the end of May, THE GREEN PARTY wanted to know from the Federal Government whether they saw a need for action in the statutory accident insurance system, in particular regarding the DGUV, and if so, what?

The answer given by the Federal Government, represented by Kerstin GRIESE (SPD), Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS): "No need for reform of accident insurance".

We take a critical look at the most important answers at www.ansTageslicht.de/wieweiter.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung (September 18th) is highlightening "Teilsieg für Menschen, die der Job krank machte"

Occupational physician and expert "Prof. Dr. Gerhard TRIEBIG" removed from circulation?

Since about 3 weeks a third edition of the BK-Report exists, concerning the classification "BK 1317  - the health consequences of solvents and their mixtures” published by the DGUV.

In 2004, the manipulation of the scientific leaflet originating from the "Ärztl. Sachverständigenrat Berufskrankheiten" (Medical Advisory Council for Occupational Diseases) was uncovered at the Federal Ministry of Labour, which is why a new one had to be drawn up. The second edition of the BK 1317 report, three years later, was different: the occupational physician and author TRIEBIG continued insisting on long outdated medical findings. Now, in the 3rd edition, the name TRIEBIG no longer appears as author. A (partial) success, about which Peter RÖDER, who got the ball rolling following the comment by Labor-Minister Norbert BLÜM, who stated at the time that it was an:  "organized wrong representation". He will now request a readmission of this case at the Social&Labour Court.

That what has been 'sold' as expert wisdom and latest scientific knowledge by several evaluating occupational physicians at court is now, latest since the 3rd edition, officially no more.

More can be found in the detailed chronology to the BK 1317 at www.ansTageslicht.de/BK1317 .

The Süddeutsche Zeitung (September 18th) is highlightening "Teilsieg für Menschen, die der Job krank machte".

Dr. Jörg HEDTMANN from „BG-Verkehr“ (Berufsgenossenschaft Verkehr = Employer’s Liability Insurance AssociationTraffic)  explains his understanding of the general  "doctrine" concerning fume events.

He had his big appearance at the 10th meeting of  „Commercial Airline Pilots“ to show how the responsible „BG-Verkehr“ views and interprets the problem of fume events. So far nothing new: Fume events are generally recognized as occupational accidents, if smells could be detected. BUT:

"But we don't recognize long-term consequences ... because we can't adequatley recognize the connection at the moment. It has not been proven by sufficient scientific evidence and the doctrine still leans in a different direction : To not give any recognition to occupational diseases anyway".

HEDTMANN's statement -  see and hear  it at minute 34’ in the video recording on YouTube.

So now we wanted to know which (scientific) names Dr. HEDTMANN associates with the "doctrine", and received an answer from him via their media spokeswoman:

"With the term 'general doctrine' I by no means referred to published findings on the causal connection between fume events and chronic ill-health consequences, but ... to the current state of science. This means that we use the classic model of dose-response relationships as a basis for assessing known or assumed effects. In connection with the undercutting of all limit values, chronic ill-health damage of the type described is therefore not plausible as a result of the so far known effects ... So far I am not aware of any published, citable and generally accepted research results that would cast doubt on this."

Now we want to know from him exactly which limit values (or their undercutting) he means by that. EASA, for example, has found around 200 potential hazardous substances in one of its studies, but has only investigated or measured around 20 in more detail. We are again eagerly awaiting the answer from BG Verkehr.

It is a first that now a (German) „Passenger Association“ has taken a position in terms of fume events and cabin air.

In a detailed (open) position paper concerning Aerotoxic Syndrome, the „Verbraucherschutzverein www.VPassagier.com“, which is also committed to a "sustainable transport policy", is crystal clear:  beginning with the publication of fume event incidents’, to demands of putting an end to the inaction of the supervisory authorities, and finally to install sensors and filters in all commercial aircraft.

The position paper can be read under „Position on Aerotoxic Syndrome in Airliners and the Risks for Passengers“. (DE) 

BFU responds: again foggy

Within the context of our presentation of Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings’ incident on 19th December 2010, we asked the BFU in April 2018: What was the result from the medical examination of the pilot who was unable to fly for six months after the fume event? Answer:

"A viewing of the ... expert opinion cannot be granted due to the „protection of sensitive security information act“ having to be guaranteed according to Article 14 Regulation (EU) 996/2010.“

In other words: In order to "protect sensitive security interests", the affected pilot must not know what medical findings the experts have established in his own case.

We have taken this as an opportunity to ask again:

a) Exacly which passage of the Regulation (EU) 996/2010 that you are citing  opposes the request of the pilot concerned, to inspect the expert opinion concerning himself?

b) What are the exact grounds for the necessity in "protection of sensitive safety information" that the pilot is not allowed to see? (…)“

We have received another reply:

• Paragraphs 1 and 2 clarify this in principle: "The (...) documents may not be made available for purposes other than those of the safety investigation (...)". According to paragraph 1 lit.c, this also applies to medical documents
• Paragraph 3 codifies the exception: "The benefit of the disclosure of the documents protected by paragraphs 1 and 2 must, in individual cases,
  • o   (1) be for a legally permissible purpose and outweigh
  • o   (2) the adverse domestic and foreign effects that disclosure may have for this or future safety investigations".

In summary: The BFU have examined all this and decided that the pilot concerned  apparently should not know about it, in order to "protect sensitive safety information" with "detrimental domestic and foreign effects".

We will again ask and have them explain the potentially "detrimental domestic and foreign effects".

We look forward to what the next answer will turn out to be.

Commission's response to BfR's poisoning assessment

At the end of June we reported, that six years ago this panel of experts had dealt with the topic of fume events (view entry 27th June) but that they had shelved the topic - after "intensive discussions".

This was a reason for us to ask whether the commissions' members would be interested in more detailed information about the close crash in question at Cologne-Bonn airport, in particular regarding  the two pilots' flight reports (see Lufthansa subsidiary Germanwings: 19 December 2010). We had just sent these notes to everyone.

The commission's management now replied: "We will take these into account in our case evaluation and if new toxicological findings are available, we will discuss the facts again at the BfR Commission 'Assessment of Poisoning' meeting."

We will now ask how the commission how they intend to find the "existence of new toxicological findings". Whether they just want to wait for them, or whether they will ask specific questions,  or do research and if so, how exactly. Or whether they would like to commission expertises themselves.

No matter how:  We are staying on the ball.

Fume Events + "Commission for the Evaluation of Poisonings" at the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR)

This commission, consisting of 15-plus experts who all deal with poisoning and toxicological issues, ‚intensively discussed’ such a fume event from November 2012 – as mentioned in the protocol position ‚Top 13’ > ’News’. Background: a doctor felt obliged to report an incident to this commission, during which, in his opinion,  a ‚poisoning’ could not be ruled out. In cases of poisonings doctors are actually obliged to do so.

The incident in question was one of the most dangerous incidents happening regarding fume events: On December 19th 2010, the two pilots of a Germanwings Airbus were surprised by a fume event during their landing approach to Cologne/Bonn airport and were barely able to bring the 142-passenger aircraft to the ground. The co-pilot had to be suspended from flying for more than half a year, the captain was fit to fly again after just a few days. The pilots’ flight reports are a dramatic read; they can be found with further information here www.ansTageslicht.de/flightreport.

The experts had apparently little concrete information but, according to the protocol were nevertheless able to assess a "causality as questionable due to the lack of toxicological analyses".

This prompted us to ask the commissioners whether they would be interested in more detailed information, specifically the flight reports of the two pilots. None of the commissioners replied to our first circular mail sent to everyone on April 11th. We sent a second mail on May 15th. Again: no feedback. Only one of the members let us know that we would receive an answer from the CEO.

Now we have yet again, sent another email on June 27th – to both the Managing Director Dr. Herbert DESEL and all commissioners with the two flight reports - to make sure this issue doesn't fall in between the cracks. We have also let everyone else know about it.

Now we will keep an eye on what happens in this commission. And we will document the progress .

The www.ansTageslicht.de/Kabinenluft translations into English are making progress

Bearnairdine BEAUMONT has translated two more chapters into English at www.ansTageslicht.de/cabinair:

• An uncovering of Tricks, Methods and Strategies, how to downplay fume events
• What Can You Do in Case of Fume Events

The latter can also be downloaded as a PDF file intended for the worst case scenario, that you know what to do. But, there are also general tips and advice about what you can do if you want to help change a couple of things. 

The „Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung“ (DGUV), which represents the'heart' of the'system' and is the control centre of the 'Cartel of Secrecy', reacted to our publication of May 26th in BOOK TWO ( the article 'The Cartel' can be downloaded as a PDF here) with a statement on its website.

However, they only commented on the publication in the printed edition of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, in which, despite the fact that a full three pages dealt with the subject- in which not everything could be presented in detail.

The DGUV's communication strategy - as is to be expected - is to focus on aspects that we only mentioned in passing or not at all.

 The DGUV does not deal with the extensive, detailed and with many 'hot docs' evidenced representations found in www.ansTageslicht.de/krankdurcharbeit at all - obviously aware that they could not really "criticize" by using their platitudinous 'counterstatements' . As expected, it is part of what we described in ansTageslicht.de in the chapter  „Tricks, Methods and Strategies“ in which we gave examples: it is a strategy of creating confusion. In a German journalism manner of speaking, one speaks in such cases of "fog candles".

Example:

The DGUV states (see paragraph 10):

 "It remains unclear on what the authors' judgement is based on,  when they describe a "recognition rate" as "absurdly low" without stating standards or reasons. What is the significance of the relationship between recognition and notifications of a suspicious nature and the quality of expert decisions? The "reputable journals" which  made serious accusations about"unclean research“ having been carried out (in which cases?), are not mentioned.“

The spokesman of the DGUV, Stefan BOLTZ, has either not read properly or does not want to do so. We did quote figures; by "absurdly low" we meant that only 7% of those who have applied for recognition of occupational ill health receive financial compensation from the "system". This figure does not even take those into account, who abandoned the lengthy recognition procedure after their first attempt.

We reconstructed several examples of "unclean" research in detail. And named the  horse and rider: names of so-called renowned professors, who are constantly commissioned for their expertise, by the DGUV, respectively by the occupational associations.

DGUV’s summary:

 "However, a dialogue can only be useful for the public if the parties involved can agree on a common basis for the discussion. "

A "dialogue" could be difficult: those who scatter“ fog candles“ show little interest in an objective discussion. How would it be possible?

The British non-governmental organisation (NGO) Aerotoxic Association Ltd has announced, that it is initiating a public inquiry and investigation by the European Criminal Court in The Hague,  to clarify the evidence of the cabin air problem and to investigate whether airlines knowingly expose their employees and passengers to the health hazards of fume events and contaminated cabin air.

According to the NGO’s statements, the organisation has identified around 2,500 affected people.

The London Economic goes in to detail : Airlines face call for international criminal inquiry into toxic exposure of crew & passengers

In cooperation with the Süddeutsche Zeitung:
Occupational Medicine + Fume Events. A Shadow Empire as a Cartel of Silence

One year ago, DokZentrum dealt with the topic „fume events“: the contaminated air in aircraft. We reconstructed how this health problem developed, and that most incidents do not appear in official statistics. This fact alone has a minimizing effect on the problem. However, the truth is: more and more pilots and crew members become unfit to fly due to exposure to toxic fumes, and are unable to work: www.ansTageslicht.de/cabinair 

These investigations left questions unanswered: Why isn’t  anyone taking this problem seriously? And why is nothing changing?

Now we have found the answers: it is the sector of  "occupational medicine" which, with its expert opinions, denies practically all connections between incidents, pollutants and subsequent health problems. In practically all cases.  It was the same scenario with asbestos, mercury, dioxin and other dangerous substances. And now it is contaminated cabin air.

The science of occupational medicine has been integrated into the system of "statutory accident insurance". This in turn is financed by the industry, the companies. Result: only 7% of all cases of occupational disability benefits are paid. Occupational medicine provides reliable help: for companies that are not prepared to take better precautionary measures since this is more expensive than compensation for a few cases.

Why isn’t anybody changing this? Because. it is a completely non-transparent system, it is a "realm of shadows". Nobody outside of the system knows about this. Not until 7pm this evening, when this documentation goes online: www.ansTageslicht.de/krankdurcharbeit or alternatively: www.ansTageslicht.de/Arbeitsmedizin 

DokZentrum shares its research results with the „Süddeutsche Zeitung“. Tomorrow, Saturday, 26th May, a compact article will be available in the printed weekend edition as a full centre fold: Cartel of Secrecy.

In the future, silence will no longer be possible.  Although the Aerotoxic Logbook has had to take a short break over the last few weeks as a result of extensive research, we will continue to report continuously.

The topic "Contaminated Cabin Air" and "Fume Events" is now also available in English

Bearnairdine BAUMANN, former chief stewardess at Lufthansa and flight disabled because of contaminated cabin air health issues, translated the first large texts of our documentation into English. Gradually, more chapters will go online in English.

Everything can be  viewed at www.ansTageslicht.de/cabinair

"Fume Events" + Contaminated Cabin Air in Aircraft?

Meanwhile, even the industry and aircraft manufacturers are no longer arguing that fume events happen. Unlike before. Now the only question remains how harmful to health they are and the consequences.

At the „German Society of Pneumology and Respiratory Medicine (DGP)“ conference in Dresden this month,  there was also a presentation about Fume Events (FE):

Prof. Dr. Dieter SCHOLZ of the „HAW“/ Hamburg explained (again), why regular occurrences contaminating the air in aircraft happen: its the „labyrinth“ seals which are supposed to prevent fugitive emissions from engine oil to escape from the "fans" by counter air flow. But that does not always work and when a problem occurs, the smallest contamination can be an emergency. His presentation can be viewed here: http://cabinair.profscholz.de

Dr. Astrid HEUTELBECK from Göttingen University, who deals with around 400 FE victims and evaluates biomonitoring data made it very clear that the procedure implemented by the Berufsgenossenschaft Verkehr  (BG) for the subsequent diagnosis of those affected in FE "does not correspond to what one should do." Since in the mean time one knows a lot more about what is to be done.

But BG is obviously not interested and this is probably why they try to outsmart the Göttingen "Fume Event" consultations; by not paying the costs for patients there anymore.

Pathologist Dr. Frank van de GOOT of the „Center for Forensic Pathology“ (CFP) in GK-Baarn (The Netherlands) found out three things after his autopsy of four deceased people who had all been affected by fume events:

1. all had a damaged peripheral nervous system (see picture), 
2. pathologists do not regularly examine damage to the nervous system, which is why this problem has not been considered and 3) that's why we urgently need "more evidence".

His suggestion, because one can hardly conduct such investigations on the living, is: in case of a death, please call  him at: +31 6 55720774. Frank van de GOOT also speaks German.